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WHY COMPANIES SWITCH
STOCK EXCHANGES
H Kent Buker

I'll rRODL CTIO"I
Each year man:,, corporation, decide to change the marketplace for trading their
secunt1es. A common pattern" to mo,e from a dealer market to an auction market: that
is. finm wmch their trading location from the Nasdaq Stock Market to a national
exchange either the American Stock E,change (Amex) or the \le,\ 'rork SHKk
Exchange ( YSE) Shifts from auction to dealer markets occur through dch,1111g. but
these change, rarely result from volunt,tr} actions b:,, management. Instead. dehsting
1yp1call:r occurs ,,hen a lirm tails to meet an exchange·, continued listing \tandards.
Other firms decide ,oluntarily to \\\1lch auction market,. usually from the i\mcx to the
NYSE. YSE dehst1ng IS pos\lbk but occurs infrequent!} and on l:r \\Ith d1lficull) 1f a
stock continues 10 ,at1,f) the hs11ng criteria. \ccordmg to Sch\\ art, ( 1991 ). \JYSE-hstcd
stocks also trade on other U S cxc hangcs. 111 the over the-counter (OTC) market. <l1rectl}
between in,estors. and m er,eas
l\lan) researcher, such as Furst ( 1970). Ying. Le\\ellen. Schlarbaum. and Lease
( 1977). Faboui ( 198 I). ';anger and McConnell ( 1986). and McConnell and Sanger
( 1987) ha,e studied the suh.1ec1 ol 1n111al exd1ange listing using, anous econometric and
stall'-,tl<.al 1cchn1quc,. Baker and l\lccks ( 1991) pro, 1de a comprchcn,1,c rc\lC\v of the
exchange h,11ng and dcl1Sting re,carch . The c, 1dencc shows that abnormal returns nse
betorc listing hut <lccl111c 1mme<l1a1el) after listing fhc abnormal returns <luring prchsting often arc attnhute<l toe,pct1at1ons of 111cn:ased hqu1<l1t) and managerial S1gnahng.
There IS no full 1 sa11,factor) c,planatHrn tor the abnormal rcturn pattcrn during posthst1ng. ot ,urpriS1ngl). ,e,eral ,tud1c, ,u<.h a, Grammatlko, and Papa10annou ( 1986a
and 1986b ). Ldelman and Baker ( 1990>. and Baker and Edelman ( 1991) show that h,t1ng
ha,, aluc for some I mm hut nm other,. Other ,w<l1es b, Reints and Vandenberg ( 1975)
and Fabo111 and Her,hkotl ( 1979) sho\\ that c,change h,t1ng doc, not change a firm",
s),tematlt n,k Yet Bhandari. (,rammat1ko,. ~1akh1p. and Papaioannou ( 1989) shm,
that h,t1ng allcu, n,k 111 the ,hort term hnall) ,tud1c, b) Baker and Spnzfaden ( 1982)
and Ph1lhps and lecher ( 1982) rndllatc that h,t1ng doc, not kmer a lirm·, cost ol cqull)
capnal
Complcmcnt1ng 1hcoret1cal and cconomctrit ha,cd rc,can:h. Bakcr and Pettit
( 1982) and Baka and John,on ( 1990) takc a d11fcrcnt approach to e,am1111ng exchange
h,t1ng The) ,un C) corporate financial manager, to dett:r1111nc 1hc1r ra11onalc for 111111a)
h,1111g and 1hc1r view, ahout ,anou, h,tmg 1,,ues. fhe,c ,tu<l1e, deal on!) \\Ith flrn1,
mmmg lrnm dealer to auctwn market, Thc c, 1<lcncc ,hm" that the mot1,e, for h,1111g
arc both ccono1111c and non economic l·or example. Baker and Johnson ( 1990) l111d that
the ma.1or 111011 ves for YSE l1,t1ng arc to ,mprn, e, ...,,b1lll). gain pre,t1ge. and 1mpro, c
hqu1d11; The) al,o report that the rclat1, e 1mportanct: of the mot1Ycs fo r c , change lis1111g
ha, changed during the 1980, for i\mcx but not YSI:. h,t1ng
A suh.1cct almo,t merlookcd 111 the literature 11nohe, both the impact of and
rat1onalc for firms ,witching from one domc,tic auction market to another. Perhaps the
lack of re,carch on Amcx-to-NYSE ,w11che, stems from the pre,umpt1on that these
market\ are ,imply subs111ute,. Although Yariou, auction markets arc more .... milar than
dealer versu, auction markets. se\·cral differences e,i,1 between the Amcx and the YSE
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that may influence management' s decision to change auction markets.
Little theoretical and econometric-based research has exam111ed the subject of
auction market switches. McConnell and Sanger ( 1987) 111vestigate the poM-listi ng
returns of 940 Curb/Amex stocks that listed o n the NYSE from 1926 to 1982. Their
evidence shows ig nificamly negative average market-adjusted returns in the mo nth
immediately after listing. Edelman and Bal,.er ( 1991) stud ied price and volume effects of
77 A mex-to-N YSE tran~fers from 1982 to 1989. They report that common stock return
are abnormally positive before listing and abnormally negative after li sting. Yet, firms
having low Amex volume before moving the YSE show larger abnormal returns both
pre- and post- listing than do more heaYily traded firms Edelman and Baker ,uggest that
shareholder wealth effects differ significant I) between Amex stock\ with low-versushigh volume that transfer to the YSE.
The primary purpose of this field research study i, to fill the void abou t why
managers decide 10 switch domestic auction marl,.ets. To date. there 1s no published
surve, research on this topic . The ,tud) addresses two research question,. Fir\!, why do
companies 11ch from the Amex to the YsE·> Second. do these mouves differ from the
motives of compa111es movtng from a dealer market to an auction market. ,pecifically, the
asdaq Stock Market t0 the YSE?
The importance of the current study lies in prov1d111g insights about management's
rationale for mO\tng from the Amex to the Big Board. Specifically. the study identifies
the percen ed benefit\ that influence management·s dec1s1on to switch auction markets.
despite the added cosh. The study compler1ents previous survey research on initial
exchange listing b) Baker and Pettit ( 1982) and Baker and Johnson ( 1990) and limited
research on auction market ,witches b) McConnell and Sanger ( 1987) and Edelman and
Baker ( 1991 ). The study al,o 1dem1f1es several managerial perceptions about w.11ch111g
auction market, requmng further empm cal invest1gat1011.
The next section briefly re\ 1cws the possible reasons for wmchtng from the Amex
10 the NYSE. The third section describes the research design and respondent profile. The
fourth ,ecuon present\ and anal) ,es the sun e) results and. where appropriate. compares
the findtngs with earlier empirical wori... The final section of the ,tudy presents the
,ummar, and conclu,1ons.

,v.

POTENTIAL RATIONALE F'OR

A \!EX-TO- YSE S\\ ITCIIES

The dec1s1on to switch from the Amex to the NYSE ma, reflect both managerial
preferences for a particular exchange and a tradeoff between the co,t, and benefit, of
mak111g the change. Although the Amcx and the YSE arc both auction markets. the)
differ in notable ways Several facwrs potenuall) favor the YSE and may influence
managers to switch auction markets. These fac tors include signaltng and certification
effecb. liqu1d1ty effect,. market siLe and compos1t1on of trading activi ty, and , isibility
and presuge.
L1qing may have positive signaling and certificatio n effects. Fo r example, news of
listing may temporanly attract increased intere,t by ins titutional holders. Temporary
increases 111 information fl ows due to inve~Lor interest may reduce uncerta inties about
stock performance and riskiness and increase the s tock's price. Furthe r, news of listing
may po,it1 vely affect investors' perceptions about the firm 's stock because the lis ting
criteria on the NYSE are more stringent than on the Amex. Meeting the listing c rite ria may
signal positive information about a firm. For example, Ying, Lewellen , Schlarbaum, and
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Lease ( 1977) suggest that It sung may serve a, an expre<,s1on of managerial confidence 111
the firm's future pro.,pects.
Further. the 111dependent e\ aluauon and approval b) the I YSI:. " ,1m1lar 10 the
certification funcuon of an 111ve,1ment banker as discussed by Booth and Smnh ( 1986).
The NYSE risk, its reputational capital when II certifies that a firm meets ccna1n
quan111a11ve and qual11at1\e standard, b) appro\rng an application for 1t,11ng Firm, an:
unlikely to u<,e h,ung a, a mechanl\m for generaung false s1gna1' because of the co,!\ of
cer11fica1ion.
Liqui<llly 1s an 11nportan1 characteristic of a good market It refer, to the ease\\ nh
\\ hich secuntu:, can be bought and ,old under normal circumstances\\ 11hou1 wide pnce
nuctuauons The 111ve,11ng pub he rn11S1der, Iiqu1<li1y highl 1 desirable becau,e <le\ 1a11on,
from the go111g market price arc costl} lO the part} whose 1ra<l111g trigger, them. Am1hu<l
and 1endel,on ( 1988) ,uggest that the liqui<lit) •lllcn:aS1ng moll\ e ma) c,pla111 the <le,irc
of some firm, to ltst on a nauonal e,changc II manager, percel\ e that mo\ mg from the
Amex to the NYSE enhance, ilqu1<lit). then <lecJSJOll to undertake such a move may be
111fluencc<l
Se\eral ,tu<lic,c\.11rnne the ltqu1dll) of<l1fferen1 market center, the \/a,<laq Stock
Market. Ame,. and YS[· Our 1111eres1 center, on!, on the rela11ve hqu1<lll) ol the Ame,
and YSE. In a stud) prepared for the '\/YSI:.. Hu, and 1-leubd ( 198--1) found that the
\/'t SF prO\ 1de, market\ that .ire more hqu1d than the market, ot the \MEX Based
p,1111all) on the.: result, ol thl\ stud). the YSl· ( 1991. p 3) claim, that II JS the .. \\Orl<l",
most hqu1d market.·· The.: Ame, com1111\S10ned lla,brouck and Schwan, ( 1986) and
\1ar,h and Rod. ( 1986) lO examine hqu1<lll) 111 <l1fferc.:111 markc.:1 center, \enher ,1u<l}
found a \lg111fi~an1 hqu1d11, <l1tlerence bet\\Cen comparably ,11e<l Aim:, and l\ 't E
I\Sue, The mixed re,ult, of ,w<l1es funded by the nauonal e\changes ma) stem Imm the
<litlcrent liqu1dll) measure, u,ed 111 c.:ach ,1u<l) Therefore. the empincal JS,ue of whether
liqu1dll) d1flcr, bemcc.:n the.: nauonal c,ch,111ge, remain, open
\nothcr rca,on for manager, dec1<l111g lO \\\ neh from the \me, to the ' Y Ema)
invohe 111,1rkc.:1 ,11c and co111pm111on of 1ra<l111g aclJ\ll) The NY E ,, a much larger
market than the Ame, h1r e,ample. b,1'ed on dollar\ olumc of equll) 1ra<l111g 111 I 989.
the 'tSF had Sl.5--12.8 billion \\hile the \me, had on!\ S--1--1.--1 billion ('- ASD. 19901
Thus. the NYSI::. ranked ,econd 111 term, of dollar \ ol~11ne of c.:qu11y 1ra<l111g 111 1989
compared w11h tenth for the Ame, The YSI- ha, proport1onall) more 111,11w11onal and
member trading and le" rc.:tail acll\ II) than the ,\me, Sorne manager, ma) prefer the,e
market charac1e11,11cs tor trading their firm·, ,wck
F111all)-. the quc,1 for recogn111on may be an 1111porta111 LOnS1dera11on 111 a firm·,
dt:cl\101110 \\\llch 10 the ' 't' SE hrm, de\lre recognnwn 111 l\\O ,en,c, of the \\Ord
they \\ant to be\ ..,,ble and to be held 111 high regard. larket ob,cn er, often regard h,11ng
on the YSE a, a prc,11g1ou, 111ile,1onc in corporate de\elopmcnt. In a ,un ,::,y of 111011ve,
for 111111a) c,change l1S11ng. Baker and John,on ( 1990) report prc,11ge a, the ,econd 1110,1
important mo11\·e from firm, mm mg from the MS 10 the I YSE but fifth among firm,
moving from the MS 10 the Ame,.
R ESEARCH DESI GN AND R E PONDENT PROFILE

Sam1>le

The YSE provided information about YSE li,1111gs from 198:! through 1990.
Th,., period wa, selccte<l to provide a large enough ,ample for ,ur,e) purpo,e~ but one
11

short enough to ensure reaching someone knowledgeable about the fi rm's YSE-listing
deci ion. The full sample contained 132 fi rms moving from the Amex to the NYSE but
dropped to 11 6 due to mergers. acquisition~. and bankruptcies. Table I shows a
breakdown of Amex-to-NYSE transfers. the sample, and the responses from 1982 to
1990. Not surprisingly. more responses came from recent years.

TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF AM EX-TO-

Listing
Year

YSE TRA

SFERS FROI\I 1982 TO 1990

Amex-to-N YSE Transfers
All

Sample

'7c of Full

Responses

9c of Sample

1982

11

9

81.8

6

66.7
33.3

1983

15

12

80.0

4

1984

17

14

82.4

5

15.7

1985

21

18

85 7

6

33.3

1986

14

13

92.9

7

53.8

1987

16

14

87 5

4

28.6

1988

12

12

100.0

6

50.0

1989

II

10

90.9

6

60.0

H

93 3

Ji

57

87 9

52

44 8

1990

Total

12
132

116

I

un e) Questionnaire
The surve)' questionnaire was patterned after one by Bal-.er and Johnson ( 1990) to
111crease comparability v. ith pa,t studies. The questionnaire had three parts. In Part I.
surve) respondents were spec1f1cally asl-.ed lO give 1heir opi11io11 on 17 1,,ues about
Amex-to- YSE switches. A ,even-po1111 scale was used to allow the respondents to
111d1ca1e their level of agreement or disagreement w1th each of the 17 que,uons: -3 =
strongly disagree, -2 =moderately di,agree, - I =slightly disagree, 0 = no op1n1011. + I =
sltghtly agree. +2 = moderately agree. and +3 = strongly agree. Table 2 ltsts these 17
issues and show, their order 1n the survey
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M\

T\81 E 2
AGE!\IE T Vll•.WS OF ISSLES \IIOt!T A'\I EX-TO0

O1'agrcc Opinion
Survey
umber

-J-2- 1

0

Y E TR \

Agree
+1+2+3

Comparl'd 1rith n•111a111111~ 011
tlu \mn, lt\llllf.1 011 tlu \ YSI
S 12 lncrea,c, a lirn1 ·, pre,11gc

0.0'i

S3

lncrca,c, im c,tor mtere,t
in a llrm', ,tock
lncn!a,c, a llrm", \1,1b1ht)

0.0

1.8

96 2

1.9

19

962

lncrea,e, the hqu1dll) ot a
tmn', ,tocl..
lncrca,e, m,111u1mnal 1m ner,hip ol a tmn·, ,tocl..
lncrca,e, re,earch nneragc b)
,ecunt) anal\ ,1,
P11l\ 1de, ,1 more el llc1en1
marketplace tor a tmn', ,wck
lncrea,e, a 111111·, ,1bih1, 1t1
r,11,c C\lemal C,lpll,11
h1rn.:a,e the pnce ,1ab1h1,
nl a Iinn·, ,11KI..
Come)' po,111\e 111tor111a11on
about a llrm', lulllre prmpech
lnaea,c, thL , aluc of .1
l11111·, ,wcl..
lnaea,c ,uppon b, the
,peuah,1 for a firm", ,toLi-.
Reduce, the mari-.et ·,
percel\ed 11,I.. ol a firm·, ,111cl..
lm:rea,c, the ,1mou111111
111lorma1mn .t\ad,1ble about
a llrm , ,mcl..
Reducc, a III m ·, c:0,1 nl
eqUII) tapual
Reduce, a 111 m ·, co,1 nl
debt capual
lncrca,c, a lmn·,
lle,1b1ht) 111 ma11er, ol
corporate gel\ crnancc

58

77

86.5

7.7

7.7

84.b

IJ 7

82 -I

5.8

19.2

75.0

58

l'i.4

788

58

25 0

69 2

11

S2
S5
SI O
S 11

S9
S4
Sl4

SI
<;c-,

SI 'i
Sh

S 16

S 17
S7

100.Wr

67 1

96

11 8

17 t,

70 t,

19 2

,o s

50 0

I l .X

52.9

10 h

46.2

21 6

47 . 1

22 0

54 0

J8 5

48 I

JIA

13.5

• '- 51 C\<Cpt SI SI() S 1,. Jnd S lfn, here ,
, I and S 17 "here '- SO
n 1 he numhcr Ill parcnthl!\C\ ,, the rnnk ut the ,1.11cmcn1 hy manngcr, \\,ho-.,c tirrn,
mmed trum the "-\IS lO the ·ys1

J,

rcr<lrtcd bi Ba~er ,rnd l<>hn,un

- 1l

S~ ERS

Mean•
(Standanl
De\ 1,H1on l Rani..

i 981
( 828)

I 12)

I 96:l

( .791 l

1711
( .911 l
1.596
( 1.272)
I 146
( 1.2.15)

I 114

6

1.269

7

I 1.191)
I I 270)

1212

I I 271)

I 000
( 1.188)

9

981

( 1.146)

S-11
11 3h2)

:'i96
(1418)
'i69
( I 044>
<I

11
12

1~8

14

117

15

.O:!O

16

500)

( 919)

( 979)
- .500
(I 196)

17

ln Part II, respo ndents were asked to choose a primary and secondary motive for
switching auction market. among six motives plus an "other" category. Table 3 presents
these motives and shows their order in the surve}. Part II contained two other questions:
( I ) "Were your firm 's expectations about lis ting on 1he YS E met?" and (2) "What was
the major reason your firm did not seek YSE li stmg earltcr'?" Respondents had space
lo write in comments after each ques1ion in this section.

Ti\ULE

3

MO T J IPORTANT MOTIVES FOR LtSTl"IG 0"< THE

YSE

Importance
Sur,e}
umber

Primary
= 51)

Secondar1
(11 = 5 1)"

Weighted
Scoreh

(

Mollve

M3

lncrea,es pres11ge (firm ·, image)

25.6',

2 1 6<;,

37

M2

Increase \ 1s1bd11y (public ily)

17.6

35.4

35

Ml

Increases liqu 1di1) (markctabilit})

27.5

11.8

34

M4

Increases abdil) to get external
linancmg

11.8

9.8

17

MS

lncrea,es pricing etl1c1ency ror
our stocJ..

59

5.9

15

M6

Prm ides a more stable em 1ronment
for our ,wcJ..

3.9

78

8

7.8

7.8

12

MS Other
• Omit, one re..,p<mc..lcnt v..ho an""'ercc.l 'don t lnov.. ..

The weighted ,,ore ,, lhe number ot rc..,pon,c, \\.Ith a motiie rated a, primar}
umc, 2, plu, 1ho,c rnou, c, rated a, ,ct:ondary umc.., I

Pan 111 was a respondent profile consisung o f four ite1m: ( I ) the firm· s industry
classi fi cation. (2) the year of NYSE lt stmg. (3) whether the responde nt was actively
111,olved in the firm's YSE listing decisio n, and (4) the respondent 's c urre nt job title.
The respondents were guaranteed anonymity but were informed that each survey had a
company code to prevent multiple mailings to them . Coding each survey also allowed
verifying the firs t two items in the responden t profile. Res pondents also were asked if
they wanted a summary of the findin gs.
14 -

A urvey and a cover leuer, which explained Lhe purpose of the study. were mailed
in April 199 1 10 the highest ranking financial officer of each company. The primary
source of the names and company addresses of these individual& was Standard & Poor 's
Corporate Directory. on-respondents received a follow-up survey and another cover
leuer in May 1991. Although space limitation, prohibit 111cluding thesurveyquesuonmure.
interested readers may get a copy from the aut hor.
Of the 11 6 initial surveys mailed. six sun·eys were returned unopened. In the,e
cases. the address was incorrect or the financial officer no longer worked for the compan1
Six other surveys were returned unanswered but with accompanying letter, staung that
company policy prohibited panicipa1111g in surveys. The fiN mailing y1eltletl 16
responses and the second I6 re,ponses. Almost all ,urveys were completely answered
Of the I 10 delivered suney,. the combined response rate was 47.3 percent. Thi, rate
greatly exceed, those of recently published financial sur,eys by Pruitt anti Gnman ( I99 I)
and RamireL, Waldman. and Lasser ( 1991 ), ,, ho had I I. I and 17. I percent respome rate,.
respectively.
Re pondcnt Profile

An attempt was made 10 ensure that only appropriate 111di,iduab answered the
survey. Each cover letter ,pectfically asked rec1p1en1s to obtain an an,wer from someone
knowledgeable about their firm's mou,e, for sw1tch111g from the Amex 10 the YSE. Of
the 52 respondents. 70.6 perce111 said they were ac1i,el 1 111volvetl 111 their firm·, tlecis1011
to list on the YSE. This finding docs 1101 mean that the rema111111g respondents were
uninformed. To confirm this belief. the response, of those acmely 111, olved 111 the listtng
decision and those who were not ,,ere compared. but they showed only m111ord1fferenccs.
Therefore. the follow111g rewlts 111cludc all respondents.
Most respondent\ were CFOs (57.7 percent). followed by board chairs. preside111s.
anti chief execuu,·e ofT1cers ( 13.5 percent). treasurers (9.6 percent). investor relauons
manager, (9.6 percent). anti others (9.6 perce111) 111clutl111g sent0r , ice prcsitlcnh and
general coun,el The evidence suggests that most respondents were top managers who
were informed about the NYSE listmg dec!',ton
The maJor 1ndu,1t") groupmg, of respondcllls · firms were manufacturing (39.2
percent), sen 1cc ( 15.7 percent). financial (9.8 percent). and retatl (9.8 perce111). The
rematning 25.5 perce111 con,1s1ed of ,e,eral 111du,1t"} groups 111clud111g dt,tnbutton.
tran,portation, and 01I and gas producuon. No bu,111e.,., 111 th is category amounted 10 5.0
percent of the total responses.
Methodo logy

The analy,i, included clescnp11,e statl',ttc, (frequencies. mean,. and standard
deviations) for each of the 17 i,,ue, about aucuon marl,,.et w itche,. Each issue was
ranked by its mean 10 renecl the responcle111s· level of agreement anti disagreement. The
percentage of respondent, giving a primary and ,econdary motive for li,1ing on the YSE
also was computed. A weighted score was used 10 rank each motive. The primary motive
had a weight of2 and the secondary moti ve had a weight of I. Adding the we1ghb for each
motive gave a weighted score - the higher the weighted score. the more important the
motive for switching from the Amex LO the YSE.
The mean responses for the first and second mailings on the 17 issues in Part I of
the survey were compared 10 assess poss ible nonresponse bias. The assumption was that
- 15 -

latter re pondents were more characteristic of nonrespondents than earlier respondents.
The t-te t values for these mean comparisons showed no significant differences among
the responses that would not be expected by chance at the .05 level. A comparison of
motives for YSE listing between the fi rMand ,econd maillllgs provided similar results.
Therefore, this ev idence, coupled with the high response rate, suggests that nonresponse
bia was not a problem in this study.
SURVEY RESULTS

Table 2 summarizes the responses for each of the 17 ic,sue statements (identified by
S) involving Amex-to-NYSE transfers. which are listed in rank-order by means. About
85 percent or more of the respondents agreed with fi,e statements (S 12, S3. SI I, S2, and
S5). These statements had few "No Opinion" responses (less than 8 percent) compared
with the remaining is,ue statements. The statement with the highe,t level of agreement
(100.0 percent) was listing on the YSE ··increases a firm's prestige·· (Sl2). Other
statements with a high level of agreement were: compared 1111/i rl'ma111111g 011 the Amex,
listing 011 the NYS£··111crea,es Ill\ estor interest 111 a firm· s stock" (S3 ). ··increases a firm\
v1,1bility" (S 11 ). "Jncrea,es the liquidit) ofa firm·, stock" (S2). and ··increaseslllstitutional
ownership of a firm', ,tock·· (S5).
These resulh were compared to tho,e reported b:r Baker and Johnson ( 1990) for
corporate executives of firms m0\lllg from the asdaq Nauonal Market System (NMS)
to the YSE over a similar period. The five highest ranklllg statement!, in tlm ,tudy
ranked among the ,ix highest statements Ill Baker and Johnson·, study The differences
in the rankings of these ,tatements between the two ,tud1es differed only slightly. except
S3 which ranked second 111 the current study but sixth Ill Baker and John,on ·, stud).
These re,u)l!, ,uggest that manager, of firms movmg from both the MS and Amex to the
NYSI::. had s11nilar opinions about the,e 1,sues.
Table 3 summarizes the primar) and secondar:r motive, (identified by M) for
mak111g Ame~-to-NYSE switches The results clear!} show that three motives stand out
a, the most 11nponant. lllcreased prcsugc (M3). increased\ 1s1biill} (M2). and increa,ed
liqu1d1ty (MI) Comparing these mot1,es to the results shcmn in Table 2 re\eab a l11gh
level of consistency between the respon,e, For example, all respondents agreed that
listmg on the NYSE mcreases a firm·, prcsuge when compared with n:ma1mng on the
Amex. The respondent\ also ranked presuge as the most 11nponant mollve for swllching
to the NYSE. In a s1m1 lar ,tud:r. Baker and Johnson ( 1990) found the same three motiYes
were the most important for lllO\ 111g from the NMS to the NYSE. These findings strongly
wggest tha1 managers perceive a lisung on the Big Board as a mean, of mcrea,ing
presuge. \ 1s1bi11ty. and liqu1dlly.
The ,urvcy asked manager, to give thei r \ 1ews on ~everal other aspects about
auction market sw11ches. One ques1ion was, "Were your firm's expeciation, abou1 listing
on the YSE me1?" Of the 52 respondents, 75.0 answered ··yes," 7.3 percent ·•no." and
the remaining 17.3 percen t answered "don't know." A few responde1m said that listing
on the YSE failed to meet their fi rms' expectations because stock price stabil ity did not
improve. Yet. most respondents believed their fi rms were satisfied with the decision to
list on the NYSE.
Ano1her question was, "What was the major reason your fi rm did 110 1 seek NYSE
listing earl ier?" Most respondents (59.6 percent) sa id their firms did 1101 meel NYSE lis1ing
requirements. Others thought that the perceived costs exceeded the benefits o f a NYSE
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listing ( 17 .3 percent). while a few (3.8 percent) cited restricti ve regulations on the YSE.
The remaining re pondents gave other reasons ( 13.5 percent) including 111ertia. atisfaction
with the Amex, and small sile. The remaining 13.5 percent answered '"don"t kno"':·
SUMI\IARY A O CO CL USI ONS

The purpose of this study was Lo survey corporate executives LO determine the \1ews
about and motives for switch ing aucllon markets. The results are based on 52 responses
to a 199 1 mail survey sent to the highest ranking financial officer of firms 1110\ mg from
the Amex to the NYSE over the period 1982-90. The evidence shows that companies
switched from the Amex to the NYSE for three maJor reasons: increased presugc.
increased visibi lity. and increased liquidity. These mouves are consistelll "'uh those
reported by Baker and Johnson ( 1990) of managers whose firm moved from the \/MS to
the YSE over a similar period. The findings of the,e tv. o studies sho"' the same major
motives for listing on the NYSE fro111 euher a dealer 111arket or another aucuon 111arl-et
Although so111e 111ay disagree. convent1onal w1sdo111 suggests that lisung on the
YSE conveys 111ore presuge and offer, greater \1s1b1hty than re111a111111g on the Amex
For example. the YSE 1s a much older and larger market than the Amex. Yet. ,everal
managenal percepuon, about S\~ uch111g aucllon markets require further emp1ncal
inveqigation. For exa111ple. at lea\! 80 percelll of the respondent, agreed that Amex-toNYSE S\\itches 111crease 111 \estor 1mere,t in a firm·, stoc"- (S3). 11\ liqu1dllj (S2).
in!>litutional ownership (S5). and research coverage by ,ecurity analysh (S I0). Although
the exchanges have conducted several inLemal ,tud1es on these issue, and comm1Ssioned
others on hqu1d11y, notably Hui and Heubel ( 1984). Hasbrouck and Schwan, ( 1986). and
Mar,h and Roe"- ( 1986). there 1s little 111dependent empmcal re,earch on these topics.
Therefore. addu1onal research Ill these areas" needed to test managers· perceptions about
market ,wuches Such research may contnbute to more efficient managerial dec1s1011
mak111g about mo, ing from the Amex to the NYSE.
The ,alue of the current study lies 1n prm1d1ng a behavioral e,ptanauon for
switching auction mar"-ets as perceived b1 high le\cl managers. mainly CFO,. The swdy
also 1dcnllf1es sc, cra l perceptions of managers about YSE list mg, rcqumng further
cmpmcal investigauon G1\'en the modest amount of academ ic research on aucuon
mar"-et sv. itches, further ,tud} of the topic appears to be a useful area of inquir) for future
researchers.
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